It is certain and evident that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been significantly weakened by the blows inflicted by Israel after October 7, 2023. Its network of proxies has been either dismantled or severely disrupted; the decades-old regime of its key Syrian ally has collapsed; the IRGC (Pasdaran) and its security services have been humiliated by Israeli bombings and high-profile assassinations; and, finally, the sites associated with its ambiguous nuclear program appear to have suffered substantial damage.

After the disastrous Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Tehran had built a sort of "asymmetric deterrence" against Israel, made precisely of allied militias and movements in the region (which were supposed to encircle the Jewish state in a "ring of fire" ), further reinforced by the Republic's missile program, capable of ensuring offensive capabilities despite the weaknesses of the national armed forces. Thanks also to the skill and personal charisma of General Qassem Soleimani – martyr par excellence of the Pasdaran after his killing by the Americans in 2020 – Iran had achieved a sort of geopolitical predominance in the region. An image of strength that frightened neighboring countries, first and foremost the Arab Gulf monarchies, and gave a sense of security that has proven illusory.

Israel’s military hyper-power has, in fact, shattered all of this. To the point that the far-right Israeli government, deluded by the spectacular blows delivered, flirted with the idea of provoking a regime change, a long-standing and barely secret dream of both Tel Aviv and Washington. For a few days in June, those who knew little of the Iranian reality wondered whether the Islamic Republic was about to collapse. An illusion indeed, since the Tehran regime, though hated by most of its population, is deeply entrenched in the country. Iran is not Syria, nor Libya or Iraq, and the Nezam (as the power system born from the 1979 revolution is called) has far greater solidity than the Assad regime in Damascus, which collapsed like a house of cards as soon as Russian, Hezbollah, and Iranian support faded.

While the current leadership is largely unpopular, no truly organized political movements have emerged so far that could challenge it. Nor are there charismatic leaders around whom to rally an alternative project to the current system of power. In fact, the main forms of “opposition” to the system that have developed in Iran have been internal to the system itself, such as the reformist movement, which sought a radical liberalization of it without calling for its dismantling. Likewise, the attempt to incite ethnic and religious minorities – from the Baloch in the southeast, to the Kurds, to the Arab minority in the southwest – to destabilize Tehran’s power system appears completely futile.

But even abroad, no truly charismatic movements or leaderships have formed: the son of the last Shah, Reza Cyrus Pahlavi, who indeed stirred quite a bit during the 12 days of war, is clearly lacking real support in the country. Among the opposition movements, the best known are the Mujaheddin-e Khalq, considered by many to be a terrorist group, and stuck in an Islamic-socialist ideology that appears outdated by history.

The Nezam is much more entrenched and solid than often thought in the West: it can count on a social bloc made up of the most disadvantaged classes, who benefit from the regime's clientelism, as well as a new bourgeoisie tied to it, where money and business are intertwined with the management of power and repressive tools. The Pasdaran are not armed forces forcibly conscripted, like many armies of Middle Eastern dictators: they benefit from this political system and are therefore willing to defend it, even at the cost of shooting their own people. Even the spectacular assassinations of their commanders, in the medium term, paradoxically risk strengthening them, since they pave the way for a new generation of officers who had long criticized the corruption of their superiors, too intent on stealing money and managing power and too little on caring about strictly military matters.

As always, Israel believes that its military hyper-power is not only a means, but also the solution to every political problem. It is a dangerous illusion: with Iran, there are no alternatives to serious political engagement.