At the end of War and Peace, after leading the reader through hundreds of pages, Leo Tolstoy asked: "What is the force that moves nations?" After all, this is the same question that scholars have asked themselves in their attempts to explain social phenomena. What forces push states to make decisions? What induces citizens to obey or disobey those in power? And what fuels the continuous fluctuations of the markets?
Over the past two centuries, countless theories have tried to answer these questions – some emphasizing the micro level and interactions between individuals, others focusing on the macro level, where states, organizations, and businesses operate. All these theories have tried, with different ambitions, to "grasp" the force evoked by Tolstoy and to identify the links between causes and effects. Yet, even the most convincing theories and sophisticated models have never been able to eliminate the inherent margin of uncertainty and unpredictability that accompanies human action and international relations. History has never ceased to surprise us, to take unexpected turns and to challenge all forms of determinism. And the world remains a dense network of interrelationships that cannot be reduced to simplistic models or explanations.
Thirty years ago, in 1995, when Aseri (Graduate School of Economics and International Relations) was born, the world was very different from the one we see today. A few years had passed since the end of the Cold War and it seemed that the world had entered a completely new historical phase, distinct from the "age of extremes" that had characterized much of the twentieth century. History really did seem "over" – not because the sequence of events had stopped (as Fukuyam's use of the Hegelian formula has often been trivially dismissed in public debate), but in a sense similar to the Battle of Jena in 1806, when Napoleon's army defeated the Prussian forces, sanctioning the triumph of the ideals of the French Revolution over the values of the ancien régime.
With the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy had prevailed over the great ideologies that had opposed its hegemony throughout the twentieth century. The principles and institutions of the liberal international order, developed after the Second World War, now had the opportunity to expand globally, creating perhaps for the first time in history a truly "global" market. The flows of goods, capital, information, and people formed an intricate web that reached almost every corner of the planet, often transforming lives at an astonishing rate.
The new School of Economics and International Relations at Università Cattolica was born from the far-sighted intuition that the world was undergoing a profound transformation and that it would never be the same again. To understand these changes – which were soon called globalization – innovative tools and approaches were needed. Year after year, the Via San Vittore campus became a point of reference for academics, entrepreneurs, analysts and international professionals who, with their skills, contributed to building a toolbox to interpret the evolving dynamics of international relations: the changing interactions between states, the logic of new wars, the role of global civil society, the process of European integration and the complexity of the relationship between "global" and "local".
Thirty years later, very little remains of that world. The principles and institutions of the liberal international order are under attack on several fronts. The "old war" (which in truth had never completely disappeared) has returned to the European continent, and the behavior of states increasingly follows the principles of classical realpolitik, making the arms race a widespread imperative. Even democratic institutions, once considered unassailable, now appear increasingly fragile, even in the areas of the world that were considered more stable.
By 2025, the optimism of 1995 may seem excessive – even naïve. But this perception is partly inevitable, because each generation tends to judge the previous one as more naïve. Indeed, optimism was a hallmark of the 1990s, and the euphoria of the "new world" was rife. However, it would be ungenerous to dismiss that optimism as mere naivety. We can predict the weather with mathematical models, but we cannot anticipate the decisions of a political leader or the collapse of an authoritarian regime, because observing a political phenomenon inevitably means altering its reality and, consequently, the behavior of the actors involved. When we make predictions about future scenarios, we influence the perceptions of those who listen to them. If some analysts were too optimistic in the past, too much pessimism would not have produced better results. Ultimately, decisions are made by people, and there is always an element of unpredictability in human interactions. This unpredictability can hold unpleasant surprises, but it is also a reflection of the freedom that defines us.
Tolstoy's question remains unanswered. And for a long time we will continue to ask ourselves: "What is the force that moves nations?", without ever finding a definitive answer that dissolves all uncertainty. However, in its thirty years of existence, Aseri has never claimed to offer deterministic predictions. Rather, it sought to train professionals, researchers, and officials capable of understanding the complexity of the present. Because in order to decide, it is essential – if not decisive – to understand the logic of the actors with whom one is confronted. And while the course of world history will – fortunately – remain unpredictable, we will continue to strive to interpret its transformations and to prepare our students to face its challenges. Especially in an age of uncertainty, we will not stop imagining the world of tomorrow.