The freedom of the seas and, with it, maritime dominance have historically been key elements in determining the balance of international politics, influencing the security and prosperity of states, first and foremost coastal states , which today make up about four-fifths of the total. During the twentieth century, The importance of the principle of Freedom of the Seas and, more generally, of maritime routes was particularly evident during the First and Second World Wars, two "constituent" conflicts of the international order. For example, between 1939 and 1945, the Battle of the Atlantic demonstrated how central the control of the seas was to the the evolution of the balance of power between the Axis powers and the Allies and, ultimately, for the victory of the latter. As Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, who certainly cannot be referred to as a navalist, has observed in his memoirs , "the Second World War was fundamentally a struggle for control of the seas and oceans and the maritime lines of communication; until this struggle was won, it was not possible to carry out our plans to win the war."
In the current context, the debate on the protection and promotion of the freedom of the seas is grafted onto the transformations of the international system in relation to the rise or return of revisionist powers, among which China is undoubtedly the main actor. In the field of maritime security (and not only), these powers tend to contest the consolidated balances that, especially after the end of the Cold War, had seen the United States establish itself as a hegemonic and undisputed naval power. A part of the recent literature has proposed a "post-modern" conception of the freedom of the seas and the management of maritime spaces, arguing that the protection of this common good is no longer entrusted to the responsibility of a single power, as happened during the so-called – and analytically controversial – pax britannica and, later, American, but to a form of international governance in which states, international organizations, private entities and multilateral regulatory regimes contribute, among which the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) obviously stands out.
However, historical experience – even if we wanted to consider only the last two centuries – shows how the freedom of the seas, in its concrete implementation, has been intrinsically linked to the presence of a hegemonic actor capable of ensuring compliance with this principle, in line with its national interests. Starting from the nineteenth century, this role was exercised first by the Royal Navy and, subsequently, by the US Navy, in both cases on the basis of a qualitative superiority impossible to match for the adversaries and flanked by an industrial, commercial and financial system of the same level. When reference is made today to a freedom of the seas that is contested in relation to fundamental strategic junctions such as the South China Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Arctic space – as also shown by the renewed centrality of Greenland for US security – we are alluding to a situation in which American dominance, although supported (although not uncritically) by the allies, he is less and less unchallenged. This gives rise to potential vulnerabilities that can affect both the maintenance of the freedom of the seas and, even more importantly, the overall stability of the international system. Always considering, however, that the balance of power is, by their nature, dynamic and requires continuous adaptation to preserve conditions such as to guarantee shared security and stability .
In this context, the role of Europe and, in particular, of the European Union, whose foreign trade depends on the sea for more than 70%, must be conceived. However, the maritime dimension is marginalised in Brussels, despite the abundance of declaratory strategic documents that have been produced over the last few years. The same Aspides operation recently deployed in the Red Sea for the protection of maritime traffic has encountered a series of difficulties and contradictions such that its results would have been much less relevant without the strong parallel and more "kinetic" commitment of other non-EU actors such as the United States and Great Britain. Furthermore, in the current process of strengthening military capabilities ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030, European attention tends to turn to a very prevalent extent to the land and air components, while the naval component remains in the background. Historical experience, on the other hand, suggests that the ambition to play a global role in guaranteeing one's own security – given that this is the repeatedly stated objective – cannot be based exclusively on the defence of borders, but requires projection tools consistent with the objectives pursued, supported in turn by political will and the capacity for dialogue. It is no coincidence that the Navy is traditionally considered as the of all the Armed Forces.
However, this perspective refers to obvious fundamental issues, directly linked to the Union's difficulty in expressing a unified position in the international context . In other words, the evanescence of a properly European foreign and security policy, understood not necessarily in federal terms, but certainly at the level of intergovernmental coordination with structurally shared and long-term goals . The military instrument, by its nature, is in fact functional to political objectives : in the absence of a clear definition of these ends or if they are ambiguous, the use of resources risks translating into a chronic inefficiency in their allocation. The European debate, as well as the Italian one , is often characterized by a persistent weakness in the strategic culture, Which certainly cannot be improvised. The onset of the second "Trump earthquake", which had one of its main epicenters in Europe, has once again highlighted these shortcomings.