The freedom of the seas and, with it, the maritime domain have historically been key elements in determining the balance of international politics, influencing the security and prosperity of states - first and foremost coastal states - which today make up about four-fifths of the total. During the twentieth century, the importance of the principle of “freedom of the seas” and, more generally, of maritime routes was particularly evident during the First and Second World Wars, two “constituent” conflicts of the international order. For example, between 1939 and 1945, the Battle of the Atlantic demonstrated how central control of the seas was to the evolution of the balance of power between the Axis powers and the Allies and, ultimately, to the victory of the latter. As Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein - who can hardly be described as a navalist - observed in his memoirs, the Second World War was fundamentally a struggle for control of the seas and oceans and the maritime lines of communication; until this struggle was won, it was not possible for the Allies to carry out our plans to win the war.
In the current context, the debate on the protection and promotion of the freedom of the seas is intertwined with the transformations of the international system linked to the rise or return of revisionist powers, among which China is undoubtedly the main actor. In the field of maritime security (and beyond), these powers tend to challenge the consolidated balances that, especially after the end of the Cold War, had seen the United States establish itself as a hegemonic and largely undisputed naval power. Part of the recent literature has advanced a “post-modern” conception of the freedom of the seas and the governance of maritime spaces, arguing that the protection of this global common is no longer entrusted to a single power - as was the case during the so-called, and analytically controversial, pax britannica (and later pax americana) - but rather to forms of international governance involving states, international organizations, private actors, and multilateral regulatory regimes, among which the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stands out.
However, historical experience - even if limited to the last two centuries - shows how the freedom of the seas, in its concrete implementation, has been intrinsically linked to the presence of a hegemonic actor capable of enforcing this principle in line with its national interests. From the nineteenth century onward, this role was exercised first by the Royal Navy and subsequently by the US Navy, in both cases on the basis of a qualitative superiority that adversaries could not match, supported by equally advanced industrial, commercial, and financial systems. When reference is made today to a freedom of the seas that is contested in relation to key strategic chokepoints - such as the South China Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Arctic space, as also illustrated by the renewed centrality of Greenland for US security - we are referring to a situation in which American dominance, although still supported (albeit not uncritically) by its allies, is increasingly challenged. This gives rise to potential vulnerabilities that may affect both the maintenance of the freedom of the seas and, more broadly, the overall stability of the international system. At the same time, it should be recalled that the balance of power is inherently dynamic and requires continuous adaptation to preserve conditions conducive to shared security and stability.
Within this framework, the role of Europe - and in particular of the European Union, whose foreign trade depends on maritime routes for more than 70% - must be considered. Despite this dependence, the maritime dimension remains marginal in Brussels, notwithstanding the abundance of declaratory strategic documents produced in recent years. The Aspides operation, recently deployed in the Red Sea to protect maritime traffic, has encountered a series of difficulties and contradictions such that its results would have been far more limited without the strong parallel and more “kinetic” engagement of non-EU actors such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, in the current process of strengthening military capabilities under ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plans, European attention continues to focus predominantly on land and air components, while the naval dimension remains in the background. Historical experience, however, suggests that the ambition to play a global role in ensuring one’s own security - an objective repeatedly proclaimed - cannot be based exclusively on territorial defence, but requires power projection capabilities consistent with the goals pursued, supported in turn by political will and diplomatic capacity. It is no coincidence that the Navy is traditionally considered as the most diplomatic service of all the armed forces.
This perspective, however, brings to the fore fundamental issues directly linked to the Union’s difficulty in expressing a unified position in the international arena. In other words, the relative weakness of a genuinely European foreign and security policy - not necessarily in federal terms, but at least at the level of intergovernmental coordination structured around shared and long-term objectives. The military instrument, by its very nature, is functional to political ends: in the absence of a clear definition of these ends, or where they remain ambiguous, the use of resources risks resulting in chronic inefficiencies in their allocation. The European debate - as well as the Italian one - is often characterised by a persistent weakness in strategic culture, which cannot be improvised. The emergence of a second “Trump earthquake,” with one of its main epicentres in Europe, has once again highlighted these shortcomings.