It is certain and evident that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been significantly weakened by the blows inflicted by Israel after October 7, 2023. Its proxy network has been dismantled or severely compromised; the decade-long regime of its main Syrian ally has collapsed; the Pasdaran (IRGC) and its security apparatuses have been humiliated by Israeli bombing and high-profile targeted assassinations; and, finally, the sites linked to its ambiguous nuclear program seem to have suffered substantial damage.
After the disastrous Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Tehran had built a sort of "asymmetrical deterrence" against Israel, composed precisely of militias and allied movements in the region (which were supposed to encircle the Jewish state in a "ring of fire"), further strengthened by the Republic's missile program, capable of guaranteeing offensive capabilities despite the weaknesses of the national armed forces. Thanks also to the skill and personal charisma of General Qassem Soleimani – martyr par excellence of the Pasdaran after his assassination by the Americans in 2020 – Iran had achieved a sort of geopolitical dominance in the region. An image of strength that frightened neighboring countries, first and foremost the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, and that conveyed a sense of security that turned out to be illusory.
Israel's military superpower has in fact shattered all this. To the point that the far-right Israeli government, deluded by the spectacular blows inflicted, has toyed with the idea of provoking regime change, an ancient and never entirely secret dream in both Tel Aviv and Washington. For a few days in June, those who knew little about the Iranian reality wondered if the Islamic Republic was on the verge of collapse. Illusion, in fact, since the Tehran regime, although hated by most of its population, is deeply rooted in the country. Iran is not Syria, nor Libya or Iraq, and the Nezam (the system of power born from the 1979 revolution) has a much greater solidity than the Assad regime in Damascus, which collapsed like a house of cards as soon as the support of Russia, Hezbollah and Iran faded.
Although the current leadership is largely unpopular, no truly organized political movements capable of challenging it have emerged so far. Nor are there charismatic leaders around whom to gather an alternative project to the current system of power. In fact, the main forms of "opposition" that have developed in Iran have been internal to the system itself, such as the reformist movement, which has sought radical liberalization without demanding its dismantling. Similarly, attempts to foment ethnic and religious minorities – from the Baluchis in the south-east, to the Kurds, to the Arab minority in the south-west – to destabilise Tehran's system of power appear completely fruitless.
Not even abroad have truly charismatic movements or leaderships established themselves: the son of the last Shah, Reza Cyrus Pahlavi, who also stirred things up during the 12 days of war, clearly does not enjoy any real support in the country. Among the opposition movements, the best known remains that of the Mujaheddin-e Khalq, considered by many to be a terrorist group, and stuck to an Islamic-socialist ideology that now appears to be outdated by history.
The Nezam is much more rooted and solid than is often believed in the West: it can count on a social bloc made up of the most disadvantaged classes, who benefit from the regime's clientelism, as well as on a new bourgeoisie linked to it, where money and business are intertwined with the management of power and repressive tools. The Pasdaran are not armed forces conscripted by force, as in many armies of Middle Eastern dictatorships: they benefit from this political system and are therefore willing to defend it, even at the cost of firing on their own people. Even the spectacular murders of their commanders, in the medium term, paradoxically risk strengthening them, since they open the way to a new generation of officers who have long criticized the corruption of their superiors, too intent on stealing money and managing power, and too little concerned with strictly military issues.
As always, Israel believes that its military hyper-power is not only a tool, but also the solution to every political problem. It is a dangerous illusion: with Iran there is no alternative to a serious political commitment.